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Abstract
To assess the scope of infection control measures for multidrug-resistant bacteria in high-risk settings, a survey among
university hospitals was conducted. Fourteen professionals from 8 sites participated. Reported policies varied largely with
respect to the types of wards conducting screening, sample types used for screening and implementation of
contact precautions. This variability among sites highlights the need for an evidence-based consensus of
current infection control policies.
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Background
In the light of increasing rates of antibiotic resistance
worldwide, there is an ongoing discussion on the adequacy
of specific infection control strategies in preventing
transmission of multidrug-resistant bacteria. Namely,
extended-spectrum ß-lactamase producing Enterobacteria-
ceae (ESBL-E), vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) and
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) are
subject of various studies in the field evaluating screening
policies, contact precautions and decolonisation practices.
Yet, results are often contradictory and the evidence
regarding the effectiveness of different infection control
measures remains inconclusive [1–3]. In Germany,
infection control guidelines of the Commission for Hospital
Hygiene and Infection Prevention at the Robert Koch-
Institute (KRINKO) exist for MRSA [4] and ESBL-E [5],
but not VRE. However, most of the respective recommen-
dations are based on expert opinions only and in the case
of ESBL-E the German guidelines differ to those from the
European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious
Diseases (ESCMID) in some aspects [6].
In clinical practice, these discrepancies together with
organisational and economic constraints lead to a high
variability in the actual implementation of infection con-
trol measures. The present survey aimed at approaches
currently established in high-risk wards in German
tertiary hospitals.
Methods
A survey was conducted between June and October 2013
assessing the current practice in screening and contact
precautions for extended-spectrum ß-lactamase producing
Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-E), vancomycin-resistant Entero-
cocci (VRE) and methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) on
adult intensive care units (ICUs) and haematological/onco-
logical wards (HO), which are usually categorized as high
risk units with regard to acquisition of multidrug-resistant
organisms. Of note, a new nomenclature of multi-drug
resistant gramnegative bacteria in relation with infection
control recommendations was introduced by the German
commission of hospital hygiene and infection prevention
(KRINKO) during the survey design [5]. This nomenclature
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distinguishes between gram negatives with resistance to 3 (3
MRGN) or 4 antibiotic classes (4 MRGN) without taking
the responsible resistance mechanism into account. This
terminology was not used in our survey and participants
were asked to report management of 3MRGN as ESBL-E,
even though a quinolone susceptible ESBL-E is not
regarded a 3MRGN. Furthermore, due to relatively low
absolute numbers of carbapenem-resistant bacteria in
Germany during the time of study conduct [7], we
did not address them in our survey. Additionally, in
the majority of cases, these organisms are detected by
ESBL-E screening and there is no controversy on the
necessity of strict contact precautions.
The survey was designed as an online questionnaire using
the software Questback EFS Survey with personalized links
sent out to the participants. An English language print-
version is available as Additional file 1. The extent of
screening samples analysed per site was assessed retro-
spectively via mail.
Overall, 23 physicians from 10 different university
hospitals were contacted to participate addressing profes-
sionals from at least two different specialities and depart-
ments (i.e., Infectious Diseases, Microbiology and
Hygiene, Haematology and Oncology). The selection of
university hospitals was based on the presence of all
mentioned departments. In case of discrepant statements
from the professionals of the same hospital, the respective
participants were asked to agree on a common answer in
order to allow comparison between sites.
Results
Participants
Fourteen professionals from 8 hospitals completed the
questionnaire. In all 5 cases with more than one partici-
pant from the same hospital, discrepant responses were
provided to at least one question. Discrepancies were dis-
cussed among the respective participants, and an agree-
ment on one common answer was achieved in all cases.
Screening policies
The participants were asked which wards perform an
admission screening for ESBL-E, MRSA and VRE and
regular follow-up screening during inpatient stay irre-
spective of previously detected colonisation. All three
pathogens are targeted during admission screening in 5
hospitals, two hospitals target only MRSA and one
hospital only VRE. The only pathogen screened for
on hospital level is MRSA (5 of 8 hospitals), while
ESBL-E and VRE are mainly screened for in HO (5
hospitals) and less frequently ICU (2 hospitals).
Follow-up screenings on different wards are estab-
lished in 5 of 8 hospitals.
In a second step, the participants were asked for spe-
cific details of screening implementation. Admission
screening is performed within 48 h and follow-up
screening on a weekly basis, irrespective of the pathogen
in all hospitals with these procedures established. ESBL-
E and VRE screening consistently involves all patients
admitted to the wards irrespective of risk-factors. Two
hospitals screen all patients for MRSA admitted to
certain high-risk wards only, 5 hospitals screen patients
with specific risk-factors [4] hospital wide, and one
hospital does not screen for MRSA.
There is a high variability in the sample techniques
used for screening. As expected, rectal swabs are in-
cluded in all sample sets, except one hospital using a
perianal swab for VRE, instead. Sampled sites for ESBL-
E and VRE are identical between admission and follow-
up screening. The detailed sets for ESBL-E and VRE
screening are shown in Table 1.
All seven hospitals screening for MRSA use nose
swabs. For admission screening, six different combina-
tions of samples were reported: only nose swab (one
hospital); swabs from nose, groin and axilla (1); swabs
from nose, groin and wounds (1); swabs from nose,
wounds and previously colonised sites (2); swabs from
nose, groin, axilla and throat (1); swabs from nose, groin,
axilla and wound (1). Only nasal swabs are used in the
two hospitals performing regular follow-up screening.
Microbiological detection of MRSA involves PCR-based
testing in addition to culture in four sites, the remaining
three sites use only culture.
Overall, the above described policies lead to a high
number of screenings performed in the respective micro-
biological laboratories. The mean number of screenings
performed in 2013 for ESBL-E was 7128 samples (range
2410–14,905), for VRE 5749 samples (range 1105–9472)
and for MRSA 4605 samples (range 684–9136).
Contact precautions
Overall, four different policies of contact precautions were
reported. Half of the participating sites (four hospitals)
apply contact precautions for all three pathogens
Table 1 Sets of samples used in screening for ESBL-E and VRE
Combination of samples ESBL-E screening - no.
of hospitals (N = 5)
VRE screening - no.
of hospitals (N = 6)
Only rectal swab 2 2
Only rectal swab or
stool sample
2 1
Only perianal swab 0 1
Perianal swab and
stool sample
0 1
Rectal swab, throat
swab and urine
1 0
Rectal swab and urine 0 1
ESBL-E extended-spectrum ß-lactamase producing Enterobacteriaceae, VRE
vancomycin-resistant Enterococci
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throughout the hospital, two apply them for all pathogens
but only in ICUs and HO wards, one site applies contact
precautions for VRE and MRSA on a hospital-wide level
and one reported applying them for VRE and MRSA in the
whole hospital but for ESBL-E only on ICUs and HO wards.
The rules for accommodating colonised patients and
for entrance to their rooms are illustrated in Table 2.
For ESBL-E and VRE the most frequently reported con-
tact precautions combine accommodation of colonised
patients in single rooms or cohort isolation plus use of
gloves and gowns when entering the room. Regarding
MRSA, the use of face masks in addition to these
precautions is applied. Of note, one hospital does not
apply any contact precautions for patients with ESBL-E
and another hospital does only apply wearing of gloves
and gowns without single room accommodation in cases
with ESBL-E or VRE.
Furthermore, we assessed the conditions under which
colonised patients were allowed to leave their room and
the respective contact precautions taken. Participants
from most sites (6 hospitals) stated that colonised pa-
tients regardless of pathogen are allowed to leave their
room at any time provided that certain precautions are
taken, while in one hospital leaving the room was only
allowed for urgent diagnostics; one hospital was unsure
about the conditions. The reported measures varied
from gowning only (1 hospital for ESBL-E, 2 for VRE)
to wearing of gloves and gowns (4 hospitals for ESBL-E
and VRE each, 2 for MRSA) or additional wearing of
masks (MRSA only, 4 hospitals).
Further infection control measures
Six hospitals perform decolonisation of MRSA in all
colonised patients, while two restrict this to certain
patient groups, i.e., to those with “realistic eradication
chances” (one hospital) and those “without tracheotomy
and without extensive colonisation” (one hospital).
Finally, the participants were asked about adaption of
empirical antibiotic treatment in the case of supposed
infection in colonised patients. The majority (six hospi-
tals) adjusts their antibiotic regimen to the colonisation
status in relation to all three pathogens, one hospital
adjusts only in case of ESBL-E and one stated to have no
clear strategy.
Discussion
This survey addressed the practice of screening for
multidrug-resistant bacteria and infection control mea-
sures of haematological/oncological wards and intensive
care units of German university hospitals. The reported
policies of participating sites differed widely in many
aspects, and even among participants from individual
sites, there were inconsistencies between answers. The
latter observation is even more surprising since all par-
ticipants had a strong background in infectious diseases.
The number of screenings performed showed that
screening for multi-resistant bacteria is performed very
frequently with several thousands of samples being
analysed annually per site. All sites performed some kind
of admission screening within 48 h on the high-risk wards
and five of eight sites have implemented follow-up scree-
ning. However, the detailed implementation of screening
varied considerably. Similarly, four different policies
regarding wards applying contact precautions and at least
three different combinations of elements for contact
precautions for each pathogen reported were reported in
the questionnaire. Particularly regarding ESBL-E the
reported contact precautions ranged from none to single
room accommodation plus wearing of gloves, gowns,
masks and hair cover.
While this questionnaire cannot give a representative
picture of the infection control measures in German
university hospitals, it clearly shows that there is hardly
any consensus among different sites despite existing
guidelines for the management of MRSA and ESBL-E
and despite the large dimension of screenings actually
performed. It is highly likely that this variability would
be equally apparent in a larger study as previously
reported [8, 9]. One can think of a number of reasons
for this: First of all, the local epidemiology may trigger
certain infection control measures to be implemented or
omitted in deviation from the guidelines. Secondly, the
complexity of many recommendations promotes diffe-
rent interpretations of existing standards in clinical
practice – probably also explaining the inconsistencies
within one institution. Thirdly, the evidence for infection
control measures is contradictory in the case of MRSA
[10] and scarce in the case of ESBL-E and VRE [2, 3]
undermining guideline adherence.
Table 2 Elements of contact precautions according to
colonising pathogen
Contact precautions ESBL-E (N = 7) VRE (N = 8) MRSA (N = 8)
Single room or cohorting,
gloves, gowns, masks and
hair cover
1 0 2
Single room or cohorting,
gloves, gowns and masks
1 2 3
Single room or cohorting,
gloves and gowns
4a 3a 3
Single room or cohorting,
gowns
0 1 0
Only single room or
cohorting
0 1 0
Only gloves and gowns 1 1 0
ESBL-E extended-spectrum ß-lactamase producing Enterobacteriaceae, VRE
vancomycin-resistant Enterococci, MRSA methicillin-resistant S. aureus
aOne site additionally stated, that masks are applied in case of colonisation
with ESBL-E or VRE in the upper respiratory tract
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The presented differences in infection control measures
highlight the need for guidelines that have the potential
for broad acceptance in the medical community. Different
management of patients colonised or infected with multi-
drug- resistant organisms in hospitals or even on different
wards of the same hospital may lead to severe pertur-
bation of patients. Given the increasing prevalence of
patients colonised or infected by multidrug-resistant
bacteria worldwide, practical issues are becoming more
relevant than ever: A higher proportion of patients in
contact isolation has been reported to be associated with a
lower compliance with precautions [11]. The increase in
carbapenem-resistant organisms also in German high-risk
settings [7], may urge one to prioritize infection control
measures. Moreover, contact precautions are known to be
associated with negative effects to patients’ wellbeing and
patient management [12], and therefore need good
evidence and strong indications for implementation.
Well-designed clinical studies evaluating infection control
measures and taking the above mentioned practical issues
into account should facilitate future guideline
development. While we did not assess management of
carbapenem-resistant organisms in this survey, a joint and
evidence-based approach is of even higher importance for
those organisms with very few therapeutic options left.
In conclusion, our study demonstrates a high variability
of the use of infection control measures among different
hospitals and among different physicians within the same
hospital. Simple, evidence based and consented guidelines
are needed for better guidance of health care providers in
the use of infection control practices.
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